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acts which applied to only one county in the state to be general laws
rather than local ones.
Dixon was followed in 1940 by a decision22 holding an act setting
up a county pfiysician and quarantine officer in Madison County to be
of a local nature pertaining to health and sanitation and therefore un-
constitutional. Within the past eight years, the court has held invalid
acts allowing Winston-Salem and Forsyth County to consolidate their
public health agencies and departments,2 3 prohibiting a county board
of education from expending more than $2,000 for extending water or
sewer sytsems to a new school,24 allowing construction and operation
of toll roads and bridges in a five county area,2 r and setting up a racing
commission in Morehead City.26 All of these were found to be invalid
under article 2, section 29 because they were local acts applicable only
in a limited territory and were within the subject matter in which such
local legislation is prohibited. It is interesting to note that the court
relied on these recent decisions to support its position in the present
case even though the amendment has been in effect since 1917. None of
these cases attempts to distinguish the earlier cases with which they
would appear to conflict.
In analyzing the principal case, one arrives at two conclusions. The
first is that Orange County could successfully prevent Sunday racing
by having the legislature pass an act similar to that passed for Wake
County invoking the state police power to enforce such a ban. The
second, and more important conclusion is that the court appears to have
settled upon a more definite interpretation of this amendment. The
cases decided since 1940 have been substantially uniform in holding that
an act is local if it is applicable only to a limited area and the restricted
subject matter has been broadened to include many areas which were
formerly excluded. We can no doubt look forward to more decisions
invalidating acts within this area.2 7
LAURENCE A. CoBB
Taxation-Income Tax-Determination of Whether Corporate
Withdrawals Constitute Loans or Dividends
The 1954 Internal Revenue Code defines the term "dividend" as
"any distribution of property made by a corporation to its stockholders
" Sams v. Board of Comm'rs, 217 N.C. 284, 7 S.E.2d 540 (1940).
"Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 65 S.E.2d 313 (1951).2 Lamb v. Board of Educ., 235 N.C. 377, 70 S.E.2d 201 (1952).
"5 Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310
(1953).
"Taylor v. Carolina Racing Ass'n, Inc., 241 N.C. 80, 84 S.E.2d 390 (1954).
" For a detailed discussion of the problem of local, private, and special legisla-
tion, see Report of the Commissiom on Public-Local and Private Legislation,
Popular Government, Feb.-March, 1949.
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-(1) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28,
1913, or (2) out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year (com-
puted as of the close of the taxable year without diminution by reason
of any distributions made during the taxable year), without regard to
the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the distribution was
made."'
It is elementary that a dividend is taxable as income to the recipient,
while a loan carries no tax consequences. In determining the factual
question 2 of whether a particular withdrawal is a loan or a taxable
dividend, the intent of the parties is the most important factor.3 In de-
termining this question there is no set rule of thumb or standard avail-
able. However, in attempting to get at the substance of the transaction
the courts usually rely on various well established criteria. An analysis
of the criteria used is necessary in order to evaluate a fact situation and
deduce with a reasonable degree of certainty the tax treatment that will
be accorded it.
1. Purpose of the Withdrawal. Whether or not a withdrawal is used
for a legitimate business purpose is usually important in the court's
determination of whether a withdrawal is a loan or a dividend. A legiti-
mate business purpose has been found in the transferring of an in-
debtedness from an outside source to the taxpayer's corporation 4 or for
acquisition of stock in a closely held corporation.5 Where the loan was
used to purchase a farm for the exclusive use of the stockholder6 or
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3i6(a). The 1939 code contained substantially
the same provision. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 115(a), 52 STAT. 496.
-Victor Shaken, 21 T.C. 785 (1954); Al Goodman, Inc., 23 T.C. 288 (1954);
Carl L. White, 17 T.C. 1562 (1952). In William D. Bryan, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem:
Dec. 57180 at 686-57, the court stated: "The question of whether the amount with-
drawn by the petitioner from the corporation was a dividend or a loan to him
is one of fact, to be determined from the surrounding facts and circumstances, and
particularly with reference to petitioner's intent at the time of the transaction."3In Harry E. Wiese, 35 B.T.A. 701 (1937), aff'd, 93 F.2d 921 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 562 (1938), where the taxpayer was the sole stockholder
the court of appeals said: "The significant fact in the present case was the intent
of the petitioner when he took the money, whether he took it for permanent
use in lieu of dividends or whether he was then only borrowing." 93 F.2d at 923.
Accord, Anketell Lumber & Coal Co. v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 210, 1 F. Supp.
724 (1932) ; Trinchera Timber Co., 13 B.T.A. 934 (1928). Where there was an
intent to repay, the withdrawls were held to be loans. A. J. Dalton, P-H 1957 T.C.
Mem. Dec. 157020; Walter Freeman, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 57014; Carl L.
White, 17 T.C. 1562 (1952); Irving T. Bush, 45 B.T.A. 609 (1941); George S.
Groves, 38 B.T.A. 727 (1938); Moses W. Taitoute, 38 B.T.A. 32 (1938); Gomez
v. Johnson, 8 B.T.A. 52 (1927).
'William D. Bryan, P-H 1957 T.C. Mern. Dec. 57180. The sole stockholder
borrowed money from the corporation to pay off a debt that he incurred in financing
the corporation and gave a note for the amount to the corporation. The court
held there was a genuine intent to repay a valid loan even though later he was
unable to repay and redeemed his stock for the cancellation of the debt.
'Isadora Benjamin Estate, 28 T.C. - (1957).
0 Gene 0. Clark, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 11 57129. There were two stockholders
who made withdrawals from the corporation in the exact proportion to their hold-
1958]
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merely to provide for his personal living expenses7 the court found no
legitimate business purpose and held the withdrawals to be dividends.
However, the fact that a withdrawal is for personal use is not always
conclusive.8
2. Formality of a Promissory Note. The giving of a promissory note
by the stockholder who makes the withdrawal is often considered by the
courts as evidence that the withdrawal was intended to be a loan.0 But
it has been held that no note was necessary where other factors justified
a finding that the parties intended to treat the withdrawal as a loan.10
In other cases the formality of a note was ignored and the substance of
the transaction merited the holding that the withdrawals were divi-
dends."1
3. Other Formalities of the Transaction. ,The fact that a dividend
is not formally declared has no effect on the question of whether the
withdrawal will be treated as a dividend for the obvious reason that the
very point at issue is whether the withdrawal is to be deemed a "con-
structive dividend," i.e., one not actually declared by the corporation.' 2
Even if it is illegal under state law for a stockholder or officer to borrow
from the corporation it may still be considered a valid loan for tax
purposes.'" It is damaging to the stockholder's position if his with-
drawals are not treated as capital assets on the corporation's books.' 4 On
the other hand if they are treated as assets on the corporation's books,
it seems to be influential in determining that the withdrawal is a loan.1
4. Repayment of .the Withdrawal. Where a withdrawal has been
partially or wholly repaid, it is in favor of the taxpayer's position that
it was a bona fide loan.' If there has been no repayment, it is evidence
ings for the purchase of farms for personal use. Even though a note was given
and was carried on the books as a "Note Receivable," the withdrawals were held
to be dividends.
"Fred C. Niederkrome, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 56255. See also Minnie
F. Lasker, P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. 52012; George P. Marshall, 32 B.T.A. 956
(1935).
8 A. J. Dalton, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157020 (withdrawals used for tax-
payer's personal benefit); Walter Freeman, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1157014
(withdrawals used to pay off gambling debts).
'William D. Bryan, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157180; Victor Shaken, 21
T.C. 785 (1954) ; Corporate Investment, Co., 40 B.T.A. 1156 (1939) ; Herman M.
Rhodes, 34 B.T.A. 212 (1936).
"A. J. Dalton, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 57020; H. C. Thorman, P-H 1953
T.C. Mem. Dec. 53294.
" Gene 0. Clark, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1157129; Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A.
228 (1941); Daniel Hunt, Sr., 6 B.T.A. 558 (1923).
"Gene 0. Clark, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57129; Fred C. Niederkrome,
P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. f156255; Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A. 228 (1941).
" Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 342 (1941).
" Minnie F. Lasker, P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. f" 52012.
"William D. Bryan, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57180; John Hamilton Per-
kins, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57128; Frank W. Sharp, P-H 1953 T.C. Mem.
Dec. 1 53255.
18 Roy J. Kinner, 36 B.T.A. 153 (1937).
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that the purported loan was actually a dividend.' 7 However, the court
will ignore the fact of repayment where it was made after the taxpayer
learned of the government's intention to treat the withdrawal as a
dividend.' 8 The fact that the taxpayer has a running account and the
amount varies from time to time will usually be to his advantage, 19 and
even where withdrawals are used to pay personal gambling debts the
periodical reduction of the balance may be important in deciding that
they are loans.
20
5. Payment of Interest. When the stockholder making the with-
drawal is charged interest, and especially where he pays substantial in-
terest, this will be instrumental in the court's finding that there was an
intent that the withdrawal be a loan.21  It has been considered that
where there was no interest this was a factor that pointed toward a
finding that the withdrawals were dividends.22  There are some cases,
however, where other factors justified calling the withdrawal a loan
even though no interest was charged.
23
6. Withdrawals in Ratio to Stockholdings. Where the withdrawals
made by the stockholders were in proportion to the amount of stock
that each stockholder owned, it was considered evidence of a constructive
dividend.2 4 Where the withdrawals were not in proportion to holdings,
the court relied on this in deciding that they were loans instead of divi-
dends.2 5 However, in other cases the courts have said that there is no
need that the loans be proportionate to the shares held or even that all
the stockholders participate in order for them to be considered a divi-
dend.2 6 If the amount of withdrawals varies annually with the earnings
Republic Nat!l Bank, 57-1 U.S.T.C. 9511; A. J. Dalton, P-H 1957 T.C.
Mem. Dec. 1 57020.
11 Regensberg vi Commissioner, 144 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1944). For cases where
solvency of the taxpayer was considered in favor of the taxpayer, see A. J. Dalton,
P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157020; Al Goodman, Inc., 23 B.T.A. 288 (1954);
Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 242 (1941) ; Moses W. Faitoute, 38 B.T.A. (1938).
But see Fred C. Niederkrome, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 56255, where $20,000
was borrowed from 1945 to 1956 and never repaid, and the taxpayer was always in
a position to repay. The "loan" was held to be a dividend.
" M. Jack Crispin, 32 B.T.A. 151 (1935).
" Walter Freeman, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57014.
"William D. Bryan, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157180; Al Goodman, Inc.,
23 T.C. 288 (1954) ; Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 342 (1941) ; George S. Groves,
38 B.T.A. 727 (1938); Herman M. Rhodes, 34 B.T.A. 212 (1936).
"Fred C. Niederkrome, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 56255.
"A. J. Dalton, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157020; Walter Freeman, P-H
1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57014.
"'Chattanooga Sav. Bank v. Bunner, 17 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1927); Gene 0.
Clark, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157129; R. E. Nelson, 19 T.C. 575 (1952).
"Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 342 (1941); Herman M. Rhodes, 34 B.T.A.
212 (1936); Kate C. Ryan, 2 B.T.A. 1130 (1925).
"
8 Hub Cloak and Suit Co., P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 56196. In Henry
F. Mitchell, 16 B.T.A. 1297 (1929), withdrawals were made by all of the share-
holders except one who did not participate.
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and surplus the court will consider this as evidence tending to show that
they should be treated as dividends.2 7
It appears from the more recent cases that there may be a slight
trend in favor of the taxpayer in deciding whether a particular with-
drawal will be considered a dividend or a loan. An example of the
older and more restrictive attitude of the courts is Ben R. Meyer.28
The taxpayer there made withdrawals from a subsidiary of the parent
corporation in which he was a stockholder, gave a note bearing four
percent interest, and made some repayments. When the subsidiary be-
came insolvent, he set up a trust to repay the withdrawals. In holding
that the withdrawals constituted dividends, the court seemed to rely
strongly on the fact that the withdrawals were used for personal living
expenses and that the stockholders were insolvent. However, in the
more current case of A. J. Dalton2 the withdrawals were for personal
use, no note was given, no interest was charged, and the taxpayer had
insufficient assets to repay at the time; nevertheless the court found
there was a bona fide intent to borrow and an obligation to repay and
held that the withdrawals were loans. Similarly in the John Hamilton
Perkins"0 case there were two stockholders each owning fifty percent
of the stock. They "borrowed" the money to pay off their personal
debts, later executing their notes but paying no interest. Perkins bought
out the other shareholder's stock after the shareholder had repaid the
corporation the amount he had "borrowed." He then liquidated the
corporation and treated the outstanding note as part of his "liquidating
dividend." The entire transaction took only about two years, but the
court found that the withdrawal was a valid loan.
If there is any reason for the trend of the decisions, it is probably
because the courts recognize the real business purpose and financial
advantage in borrowing from one's own corporation rather than recog-
nized lending institutions.3' The conclusion that the taxpayer's posi-
tion is being upheld should not lull any prospective debtor into a sense
"7See Albert Bittens, 2 B.T.A. 535 (1925), where the court stated that the
withdrawals had no relation to earnings or surplus and held them to be loans
rather than dividends. See also C. W. Murchison, 32 B.T.A. 32 (1935), where
the taxpayer was sole owner of the corporation and the withdrawals varied in
accordance with the net earnings. Held, dividends. But see Walter Freeman,
P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 57014, at 57-63, where the withdrawals were sub-
stantially the same as the current income or accumulated earnings and profits.
The court nevertheless found that they were not dividends, stating that the tax-
payer repaid part of the withdrawals and that "after considering all of the evi-
dence we have concluded that the withdrawals were intended as loans ..
2845 B.T.A. 228 (1941).
2 P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 57020.
"0 P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 57128. See also William D. Bryan, P-H 1957
T.C. Mem. Dec. 157180; Louis Coutemanche, Jr., 53-1 U.S.T.C. 9303 (1953),
"' Isadora Benjamin Estate, 28 T.C. - (1957); William D. Bryan, P-H 1957
T.C. Mem. Dec. 1f 57180.
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of security, because the courts are still prone to look through the form
of a transaction to its real substance. The taxpayer would be well ad-
vised to consider carefully the above mentioned factors which influence
the courts in deciding cases. No one factor is usually conclusive in
deciding a case, but certainly the more consideration the stockholder
gives to each, the greater the possibility that he will not be caught in a
tax trap.
GAITHER S. WALSER
Torts-Negligence-Last Clear Chance
A recent North Carolina case' involving the doctrine of "last clear
chance" seems to have been decided contrary to a long line of unbroken
precedents. The case was this:
The defendant was driving down an unpaved public road at eight-
thirty p.m. The evidence favorable to the plaintiff showed the road at
the place in question was straight and virtually level for a distance of two
to three hundred feet, and that there were no obstructions to vision.
The plaintiff was lying in the road asleep, between and parallel to two
ruts which were in the road. The defendant approached the plaintiff
with his lights on low beam and did not see him until approximately
twenty-five feet away. He first thought the plaintiff's body was a box
or the like, and did not recognize it as a human being until five or six
feet away. The defendant's car passed over the plaintiff, straddling him
with its wheels, but the oil pan on the car struck the plaintiff in passing,
inflicting serious injuries. The defendant stopped twenty-five feet
beyond the place where the plaintiff was lying.
The defendant's motion for nonsuit at the trial below was granted,
and on appeal it was affirmed, the court holding in a four to three de-
cision that the doctrine of last clear chance was inapplicable on the facts.
It is proposed in this Note to look briefly at the background of the
doctrine of last clear chance, after which an attempt will be made to
deduce from the North Carolina cases the principles underlying the law
of last clear chance in North Carolina. Finally, the principal case will
be examined in the light of these principles.
The doctrine of last clear chance is well-established in North Caro-
lina, as in most common law jurisdictions. 2 Although it is stated
'Barnes v. Homey, 247 N.C. 495, 101 S.E.2d 315 (1957).
'Wade v. Jones Sausage Co., 239 N.C. 524, 80 S.E.2d 150 (1954) ; Newbemn v.
Leary, 215 N.C. 134, 1 S.E.2d 384 (1939); Triplett v. Southern Ry., 205 N.C. 113.
170 S.E. 146 (1933) ; Caudle v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 202 N.C. 404, 163 S.E. 122
(1932) ; Norman v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., 167 N.C. 533, 83 S.E. 835 (1914);
Sawyer v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 145 N.C. 24, 58 S.E. 598 (1907);
Lassiter v. Raleigh & G. R.R., 133 N.C. 244, 45 S.E. 570 (1903) ; Bogan v. Caro-
lina Cent. R.R., 129 N.C. 154, 39 S.E. 808 (1901) ; Pickett v. Wilmington & W.
1958]
